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EffectiveExchange Rates,
Effective Protection Rates, and
Domestic Resource Costs
Inthis chapter, one of the major purposes of this study is carried out: deter-
mining the impact of the NER and supporting policies, described in the two
previous chapters, on effective rates of protection and exchange and related
constructs. The focus of section 5.1 is on the time patterns of import premiums,
PLD-EERs, and PLD-EER(PI)s in the years since World War II. In section
5.2, ITR, EPR, and DRC estimates are examined for selected years in the
1960s.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
i.Over-all PLD-EERs have been moving secularly downward. PLD-
EERs for imported goods, moreover, continued to decline even in the 1965—70
A
sliding-pegperiod. Ceteris paribus, this trend implies increasing balance-of-
- I paymentspressures.
ii. Import premiums have been quite high and have tended to move in-
versely to PLD-EERs. During the sliding-peg experience of 1965—70, however,
the large expansion in the availability of foreign exchange (primarily from the
copper boom generated by the Vietnam War) made it possible to reduce both
import premiums and PLD-EERs. a
iii. Barriers for imports generally have been quite high and variable.
iv. The dispersion in such barriers has been very substantial among pro-
duction sectors and subsectors and among end uses. Moreover, policy changes
have not been highly correlated in their effect on these categories. Nevertheless,
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the regimes have generally tended to favor manufacturing over agriculture and
agriculture over mining—the traditional "easy" import-substituting industries,
which had received high protection since the nineteenth century—over in-
dustries producing intermediate goods (at least until the late 1960s); import
substitution over export promotion; and goods imports over nongoods inter-
national transactions.
v. Such discrepancies in the treatment of sectors of the economy gen-
erally declined at the start of liberalization attempts, although not the pref-
erence for manufacturing over agriculture. The discrepancies often increased
as these efforts faltered. They were reduced most substantially and maintained
at a low level for the longest period of time during 1967—70, the last four years
of the Frei administration.
vi. In times of foreign-exchange crisis, restrictions have been increased
most severely on nongoods transactions and on investment-goods imports.
These restrictions have resulted in a clear trade-off between short-run balance-
of-payments needs and long-run growth objectives.
vii. Since exports respond to price incentives (see section 7.2), those
policies utilized in part because of the export pessimism derived from the Great
Depression experience have reinforced that pessimism by strongly discouraging
export expansion and diversification.
5.1TIME PATHS OF IMPORT PREMIUMS,
PRICE-LEVEL-DEFLATED EFFECTIVE




•o Aggregatepatterns are described in section 5.1.1; disaggregate patterns, in
section 5.1.2.
5.1.1Time Patterns in Aggregate Import Premiums and Price-Level-
Deflated Effective Exchange Rates.
A summary of the aggregate impact of the policies on import premiums
and PLD-EERs described in the two previous chapters is shown in Table 5.1;
the PLD-EERs are shown for both goods imports and nongoods transactions.
The first important characteristic to be noted in the data shown, as well as in
the summary statistics shown in Table A. 1 and elsewhere, is the secular decline
•, inthe PLD-EERs since World War II. These movements have not been mono-
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Phase andGoodsTransactionsCot. I Rate
Year (1) (2) (3) (4)
II
1946 5.64 5.30 0.94 76%
1947 4.69 5.68 1.41 79
1948 4.49 6.14 1.37 61
1949 4.11 6.36 1.55 93
1950 4.59 6.51 1.42 68
1951 4.24 5.12 1.21 67
1952 4.01 6.04 1.51 90
1953 3.64 6.74 1.85 112
1954 2.85 6.83 2.40 166
1955 2.90 7.35 2.53 204
'II
1956 3.62 4.61 1.27 132
1957 4.89 4.70 0.96 65
1958 4.37 5.69 1.30 64
- Iv
1959 4.61 3.90 0.85 51
1960 4.26 3.53 0.83 60
1961 4.02 3.27 0.81 62
II
1962 4.00 4.82 1.21 60
1963 4.33 5.68 1.31 46
1964 3.65 4.26 1.17 69
III
1965 3.85 3.89 1.01 57
1966 3.66 3.80 1.04 56
1967 3.59 3.79 1.06 52
1968 3.70 3.98 1.08 43
1969 3.48 3.83 1.10 46
1970 3.35 3.98 1.19 47
Mean
(1946—70)4.02 5.03 1.25 77
Souaca: The PLD-EER for imported goods is obtained by
deflatingthe EERs in column 14 of Table A.7 by the Chilean GDP P
deflator.The PLD-EER for nongoods transactions is the PLD-NER
for the black or free market before 1950 and the PLD-NER for the
brokers' market thereafter (coLumns 6 and 12 in Table 3.2) ad.
justed for the taxes describedatthe start of section 4.3. The im-
port premium rate is defined in the notes to Table A.!. The PLD-
EERs are in1965escudos per dollar.
-..-- . .
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five years shown; the PLD-EER for nongoods transactions, twice as often.
Nevertheless, the basic underlying trend is clear: the mean PLD-EER for im-
ported goods over phases and subphases, for example, fell from 8.48 escudos
per dollar for 1940—46 to 3.60 for 1965—70, increasing only between 1952
and 1955 and between 1956 and 1958 (line 1.1.7 in Table A.1). The major
factor underlying this fall was the drop in PLD-NERs discussed in section 3.2.
Ceteris paribus, such a decline would seem to have increased the need for
quantitative restrictions to prevent large balance-of-payments deficits.
Second, the import premium rate tended to increase until the end of the
quarter-century of Phase II restrictions, in 1955, and tended to decrease secu-
larly thereafter (line 1.1.6 in Table A. 1). The latter tendency was possible
despite the simultaneous secular decline in the PLD-EERs because of the
rapidly expanding command of Chile over foreign exchange from exports and
from nonmonetary capital inflows (see Table 8.1).
Third, it should be noted that phase-coincident patterns were superim-
posed on these secular trends. The PLD-EER for goods increased at the start
of each liberalization attempt (1956, 1959, and 1965) because of associated
large devaluations. At the same time and for the same reason, the import
premium rate declined, its fall reinforced by expanded imports financed from
stabilization funds. The PLD-EER for nongoods transactions dropped at the
start of each liberalization effort as the government attempted to reduce dis-
parities among various EERs. The ratio of the PLD-EER for nongoods trans-
actions to that for goods transactions was greater in the Phase II periods, as
disparities in charges among uses increased with exchange control.
Fourth, in terms of short-run fluctuations, the PLD-EER for imported
goods and the import premium rate tended to move inversely (the simple cor-
relation coefficient between the two is —0.46), reflecting price responsiveness
in import demand or export supply, or both. This point is illustrated in Figure
5.1 by simplified supply-and-demand curves in a foreign-exchange framework.
At a price for a unit of foreign exchange of P0, the available quantity is Qo,
andthe import premium rate is (P3 —P0)/P0.At a higher price for foreign ex-
change, P1, the quantity supplied increases to Qi, and the import premium
rate falls back to (P2 —P1)/P1.(In the diagram, the same PLD-EER is as-
sumed to hold for both exports and imports. In reality, a substantial difference
has existed, as is discussed below in this chapter.)
Fifth, the PLD-EER for nongoods transactions generally was higher than
that for goods. The discrepancy has not been as great, however, as considera-
tion of PLD-NERS alone might suggest (Table 3.2) because other policies
have affected exchange costs for goods much more than for nongoods. Never-
theless, policies usually have discriminated against invisible and service im-
ports as opposed to goods imports. Capital inflows, however, have often beenFIGURE 5.1
allowed at more favorable PLD-EERs than goods (but vice versa for capital
outflows).
The major exception to this situation occurred in the Phase IV years of
1959—6 1.' The unified NER for those years, combined with disparities in the
effects of supporting policies, resulted in lower PLD-EERs for nongoods than
for goods transactions. As a result, discrepancies between the PLD-EERs for
goods and for nongoods were larger than in some periods with a multiple ex-
change-rate system, e.g., 1965—69.
Sixth, the import premium rate has been quite high, averaging 77 per cent
for 1946—70. Import taxes and related policies have absorbed some of the
differences between international and domestic prices, but quite substantial
returns have been left for importers and for protected industries.
Finally, with regard to the sliding-peg NER policy of 1965—70, it should
be noted that despite the government's announced intention to the contrary,
the PLD-EER for imported goods declined by 13 per cent during the period.
The mean PLD-EER for import goods during the same phase was lower than
in all but one (1952—55) of the phases and subphases after 1940 (see line
1.1.7 in Table A. 1). The import premium rate declined during the phase and
was at the lowest mean level of all post-1945 phases and subphases (see
line 1.1.6 in Table A. 1) in spite of the low and declining PLD-EER for im-
ported goods. This phenomenon reflected the copper boom generated by the




ly of foreign exchange
(for imports)finance substantially increased imports (see Table 8.1). The decline is roughly
illustrated in Figure 5.2,whichis drawn under the same simple assumptions
utilized in Figure 5.1. Before this phase the price of foreign exchange was P0,
the quantity was Qo,andthe premium rate was (P3 —P0)/P0.In 1965—70,
the demand for foreign exchange may have shifted somewhat to the right to D'.
The supply of foreign exchange, expanded as described above, is depicted by
5'. As a result the following combination is observed: a reduced price at
P4, an increased quantity at Q4,anda lowered import premium rate of
(P5 —P4)/P4.
During 1965—69, the PLD-EERs for goods and nongoods were more
nearly identical than in any earlier phase or subphase following the Second
World War, except 1946 and 1957. They were also closer than in the years of
the unified NER, 1959—6 1 (Phase IV). The disparity increased year by year
during the 196 5—70 phase, however, in part because of attempts to limit capital
flight during the long political campaign before the 1970 election.
5.1.2Time Patterns in Disaggregate Premium-Inclusive Price-Level-
Deflated Effective Exchange Rates.
Because of the complexities, specificity, and frequent alterations in the
foreign-sector regime in recent decades, which was described in the two preced-
FIGURE 5.2
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ing chapters, determination of disaggregate PLD-EERs and import premiums
separately would require resources far beyond those available for this study.
Instead, therefore, concentration is on PLD-EER (P1) s for disaggregate anal-
ysis. Such measures include the total effect of the international regime on in-
ternal prices, that is, on the EERs plus any premium importers receive.2 Equiv-
alently, these measures represent the total effects of foreign-sector policies on
prices paid not by the original importer, but by the second buyer, i.e., the
person or firm the original importer sells to.3
PLD-EER(PI)s on the individual product level for each of 220 items
considered in this study could be presented and examined. Such detail, how-
ever, would be overwhelming. Important broad patterns would be difficult to
discern. Instead, one would run the risk of being sidetracked by unimportant
idiosyncrasies. The focus in this subsection, therefore, is on the intermediate
level of aggregation of PLD-EER(PI)s presented in Table A.8: 18 subsectors,
three sectors, (agriculture, mining, and manufacturing), and nine demand
components. Three other tables contain statistics constructed from the series
in Table A.8 to aid in the analysis. Table 5.2 includes ratios of various dis-
1
aggregate PLD-EER(PI)s; the correlation coefficients among them are shown
in Table A.9. Table A.10 contains percentage changes in the PLD-EER(PI)s
relative to the national accounts PLD-NER. Six important broad charac-
teristics in the post-World War II patterns of the disaggregate rates may be
seen in the data contained in the four tables:
i.Variations in the PLD-EER(PI)s among subsectors, sectors, and de-
mand components have been substantial. The ratio of the highest to the lowest t
PLD-EER(PI) in each subsector ranged from 2.82 to 12.43, with an average
of 5.08 (Table 5.2, column 1). The subsectors with mean PLD-EER(PI)s
above the over-all average (in order) are footwear, coal mining, textiles,
leather and leather products, nonmetallic mineral products, other manufac- I
tures, beverages, food products, and basic metals. Policies since the Second
World War, thus, have tended to maintain high barriers for those subsectors C
which first received protection as "infants" in the nineteenth century! S
On the sectoral level of aggregation, barriers have been highest for manu-
facturing and lowest for mining, with agriculture in between. The ratios of the S
PLD-EER(PI)s for agriculture to those for manufacturing averaged 0.65 a
(column 2). The mean PLD-EER(PI) for mining was only half of that for
manufacturing (column 3). The impact on sectoral terms of trade, thus, has a
been considerable. These distortions in incentives probably explain in con-
siderable part the relative stagnation in agriculture and the limited expansion I,
of minerals exports (on responses to price incentives, see Part HI, below), a
Among demand classifications, barriers have been highest for consumer
1
goods and about the same on the average for both investment and intermediate b
goods. The mean PLD-EER(PI) for investment goods was 0.64 of that forEERs, EPRs, AND DRCs 133
consumer goods, while that for intermediate goods was 0.62 (columns 4 and
Vns 5). These relative values reflect the maintenance of high effective protection
to encourage import substitution for consumption products.
The mean PLD-EER(PI) for imports, finally, was 1.53 times that for
exports (column 6). This difference reflects the basically inward-looking,
import-substituting nature of the post-World War II regimes. The lack of more
011 rapid growth in exports, once again, originates substantially in this discrim-
the inatory treatment against them (section 7.2).
ii.If there has been any general secular tendency, it has been a narrow-
InS ing of differentials among subsectoral PLD-EER(PI)s as well as for agricul-
ture relative to manufacturing, intermediate relative to consumer goods, and
• imports relative to exports (columns 1, 2, 5, and 6). However, such trends
• are not very pronounced. That the last phase in the 1946—70 period was more
liberal than the first, moreover, may cause phase-coincident changes to be
• misinterpreted as secular trends.
ties
iii.Shifts to more liberal phases were generally characterized by reduc-
tions in differentials. In the first year of each of the three cases of shift, the
wn PLD-EER(PI) for imports declined relative to that for exports-(column 6).
The range among the subsectors declined (column 1) in the first year in two
cases, and so did the relative discrepancy between mining and manufacturing
be (column 3), with an especially large drop in 1956, the first full year of the
• Nuevo Trato (see subsection 4.2.1 above).
tie- On the other hand, the discrepancies of agriculture relative to manufac-
est turing on two occasions increased in the first year of liberalization attempts
(column 2), and in the third case remained unchanged. This apparent anomoly
reflects the fact that all three liberalization attempts were part of stabilization
programs. In each case considerable effort was expended in trying to moderate
• agricultural price increases since prices in this sector had large weights in the
general price indices. These indices were taken as the most important indicator
of the short-run success or failure of the anti-inflationary effort and thus
strongly affected short-run inflationary expectations.
The ratio of the PLD-EER(PI) for intermediate goods relative to con-
sumer goods moved toward unity in the first year of only one liberalization
65 attempt (column 5 in Table 5.2). This observation suggests that generally, at
tor least the consumer-good, import-substitution activities were not squeezed by
a sharp drop in EPRs at the start of liberalization attempts.
iv. During the more liberal phases, the patterns were somewhat mixed.
During the 1956—58 phase, discrepancies tended to decline among subsectors,
among demand components, and between mining and manufacturing (columns
1, 3, 4, and 5). Those between imports and exports and, to a lower degree,
flte between agriculture and manufacturing, however, increased substantially as
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4136EVOLUTION OF EXCHANGE CONTROL REGIMES IN RECENT DECADES
During the 1959—61 phase most discrepancies tended to decline or remain
about the same, with the possible exception of those for demand components
by use (columns 4 and 5).
In the first four years of the 1965—70 phase almost all relative differences
tended to be reduced. Although some increased thereafter, e.g., among sub-
sectors or between mining and manufacturing, important further reductions
occurred for agriculture versus manufacturing, intermediate goods versus con-
sumer products, and exports versus imports (columns 2, 5, and 6). In all three
cases the relative discrepancy for 1969 was smaller than for any preceding
year included in Table 5.2. Liberalization, therefore, increased near the end
of the Frei regime to a level which almost merits the characterization of the
period as Phase IV.
v. The subsectoral PLD-EER(PI)s were not particularly well correlated.
Among the 19 production subsectors, correlation coefficients are positive and
significantly nonzero at the 5 per cent level for only 96 of the 171 pairs (Table
A.9). In only 55 of these pairs, moreover, was the coefficient of determination
0.50 or higher.
Disaggregation to this level, therefore, usefully points out the disparities
not only in the average levels of PLD-EER(PI)s, but also in the changes over
time. The latter have arisen for two reasons: First, modification in the regimes,
as noted in the two previous chapters, often has been for specific products or
small groups of products. Second, unchanged quantitative restrictions have
implied import premiums that vary greatly with shifts in demand and supply.4
The ratios of the standard deviation to the mean give an index of the
relative volatility of the subsectoral PLD-EER(PI)s. On this basis the most
volatile subsectors (in decreasing order) have been coal mining, textiles, basic
metals, and nonmetallic mineral products (Table A.8). The least subject to
such fluctuations (in increasing order) have been other manufacturing, agri-
culture and forestry, electric machinery, and paper and paper products.
The relative degree of fluctuation among subsectors does not suggest any
general cause (intended or otherwise), although the ranking of some of the
sectors does have clear explanations. The high value for coal mining, for ex-
ample, reflects the explicit decision made in the 1950s to reduce the PLD-
EER(PI) because of the importance of coal as an input in the new iron and
steel industry. The low value for agriculture also may reflect a policy decision
(or just good luck) to keep fluctuations relatively low for this politically sensi-
tive subsector.
On the same basis the ranking of fluctuations in PLD-EER(PI)s among
demand categories has been (in increasing order) intermediate products, ex-
ports, consumer goods, imports, and investment goods. Several aspects of this
ranking merit emphasis: (a) The order does not seem to depend upon the
extent to which the categories enter into international trade, that is, aggregatesEERs, EPRs, ANDDRCs 137
made up more substantially of nontraded goods are not necessarily more (or
less) volatile than those made up of tradable goods. (b) The level of exports
r hasbeen discriminated against, not their fluctuations. (c) Variations for inter-
• mediate goods have been relatively low. This implies some success of attempts
not to disrupt operation of existing capacity through erratic changes in the
availability of imported inputs. Cd) The high fluctuations for investment
goods reflect the decision to postpone machinery and equipment imports at
• times of foreign-exchange shortages, but to encourage them at other times.
vi. Changes in NERs are poor indicators of variations in EER(PI)s: the
nd ratios of the latter to the former often change quite considerably (Table A.1O).
We Some fairly general consistencies do appear, however, in these ratios. During
the last year of phases these ratios generally have increased because of greater
restrictiveness in response to foreign-exchange shortages (which often have
been an important factor in the decision to shift to another phase)However,
for goods actually imported (as opposed to importable), the EER(PI) gen-
erally did not fluctuate much relative to the NER. As would be expected, in the
first year of liberalized phases, the ratios for imports generally dropped be-
jes cause of reduced restrictiveness,6 but the export ratios did not because of the
attempt to reduce discrimination against them at the start of liberalization
efforts.
•or
ye 5.2IMPLICIT TARIFF RATES, EFFECTIVE
PROTECTION RATES, AND DOMESTIC
he RESOURCE COSTS IN THE 1960s
)st
This section is focused on the implications of relatively careful estimates of
to ITRs, EPRs, and DRCs, shown in Table 5.3, for 1961, 1967, and 1968 (ex-
ports only in the last year) by production subsector.7
The implicit tariff rate (ITR) indicates the effect of the international
trade regime on the product price. The ITR is defined as the ratio to the c.i.f.
price of the difference between the domestic price (net of normal distribution
costs) and the c.i.f. price. Chilean ITRs generally cannot be calculated by
simply adjusting the c.i.f. prices by legal tariff rates and other legal charges P
because quantitative restrictions sometimes create substantial import premiums
(see line 1.1.6 in Table A. 1) and because there are numerous exemptions from
the legal rates (see subsections 4.1.5 and 4.1.7). Therefore direct price com-
parisons 8areused, as explained in detail in Appendix B.
g The effective protection rate (EPR) measures the impact of foreign-sector
policies on domestic value added.° The EPR is defined as the ratio to the inter-
•s national value added of the difference between domestic value added and
e international value added. Again, direct price comparisons are used, and the

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































S140EVOLUTIONOF EXCHANGE CONTROL REGIMES IN RECENT DECADES
Notes to Table 5.3
NOTE: Sources and definitions are given in Appendix B. Some analysis of the con-
sistency of the alternative sets of accounts is also presented there. For 1961, two sets of
EPRs are given. The first includes more sectors, but the second is more consistent with
the 1967 estimates (see Appendix B).
The estimates shown are not adjusted for overvaluation because of the difficulty of
establishing the degree of overvaluation. All available indices suggest that the escudo
was overvalued by 20 to 70 per cent in the 1960s (see line 1.1.1 in Table A.1 and the
source note for column 2.1.3 in Table A. 11). If overvaluation were taken account of in
the calculations, the real protective barriers for import substitution would not appear to
have been so high on average as is implied in the text. In any case, overvaluation did not
alter the dispersion of protection among subsectors, which is the point of major interest.
To illustrate the possible effect of such adjustments, however, note that Jeanneret [1971:
1651 presents overvaluation-adjusted counterparts of ITRI and EPRI with respective
means of 9 and 111 per cent. Although her adjustment seems to be too large for a 68
per cent overvaluation in 1961, this example is suggestive of the possible order of mag-
nitude of this effect.
a. For subsectoral exports only.
b. Value was negative, indicating that the total foreign-exchange cost per unit ex-
ceeds the foreign-exchange final-product price.
The domestic resource cost (DRC) is the value of domestic resources (at
opportunity costs) employed in earning or saving a dollar of foreign exchange
in the domestic production of a good.1° As before, the sources and method of
construction are presented in Appendix B.
5.2.1Mean Level of the Rates.
The levels of the ITRs and EPRs for 1961 and 1967 were quite high. The
respective mean ITRs were 83 and 48 per cent. For 10 subsectors in 1961 and
3 in 1967 the ITRs exceeded 100 per cent. The respective mean EPRs were
133 11 and 168 per cent. For 11 subsectors in 1961 and 6 in 1967 the EPRs
exceeded 100 per cent. The protective barriers created by the trade regimes
thus seem to have been quite substantial on the average.12
5.2.2Sectoral andSubsectoraLDifferences in Relative Protection.
The most important characteristic of the estimates in Table 5.3 is the
existence of substantial differentials among sectors and subsectors and between
end uses. For all but the 1968 ITR and EPR estimates, which are for exports
only, the ranges and standard deviations between subsectors were quite high:
for ITR1, a range of 255 per cent and a standard deviation of 58 per cent;
ITR2, 162 and 51 per cent; EPR1, 2,898 and 552 per cent; EPR2, 488 and
117 per cent; EPR3, 1,127 and 282 per cent; DRC1, 2,109 and 598 per cent;
and DRC2, 339 and 86 per cent. These variations imply substantial cross-
sectoral distortions in signals for product usage and in the rates of transforma-EERs, EPRs, ANDDRCs 141
tion between domestic and foreign resources. As Nugent [1971] has demon-
strated, moreover, the welfare loss due to greater variance in protection among
products for a given mean level of protection can be quite considerable.
RANKING OF SECTORAL DIFFERENCES.
On the sectoral level, protection has been highest for industry, lowest for
be mining, and in between for agriculture. However, in 1961 agriculture had a
relativelyhigh EPR (EPR2) and DRC. This result raises questions about the
widespread assumption that agriculture is a low-DRC sector against which
substantialdiscrimination has occurred.
RANKING OF SUBSECTORAL DIFFERENCES.
• In 1961 the ranking (in decreasing order) of subsectors with EPRs
r (EPR2)of over 100 per cent was textiles, leather and leather products, foot-
wear and clothing, food products, nonmetallic mineral products, beverages,
rubber products, other manufactures, furniture, and chemical products.'3 The
most protected subsectors near the end of the most liberal phase since the
H Great Depression thus tended to be the traditional, "easy" import-substitution
at ones. These industries not only had received conscious protection in most cases
since the 1897 tariff law, but most import substitution in them had been made
• before the Second World War! 14Moreover,the DRCs for many of these sub-
sectors were quite high (see DRC 1).
Jeanneret [1971:167] interprets this pattern to mean that those sectors
which had relatively high EPRs remained traditional and inefficient in their
operation because they had only limited competition from imports. Her inter-
pretation depends upon the assumption that approximately the 1961 EPR
structure had prevailed for a number of years. This seems to be a strong as-
sumption, however, given the changes, described earlier, in the international
economic regime.
•IS A more plausible interpretation is that in the process of liberalization in
1959—6 1, protection was lowered less for the more stagnant and more tradi-
tional subsectors than for the others, leaving the former relatively protected.
This occurred because the vested interests in these industries were very strong P
e politically and because of the desire not to risk too great a disruption in these
labor-intensive sectors from a flood of competitive imports. This explanation is
consistent with the observed protection patterns in 1961, the general liberaliza-
tion in the previous years, and the significantly negative correlation between
EPR2 and the growth in product over the 1953—61 period (Table A.5).
IMPORT SUBSTITUTION VERSUS EXPORT PROMOTION.
• A very important set of discrepancies were those which favored import
substitution over export promotion despite the comparative advantage of the142EVOLUTION OF EXCHANGE CONTROL REGIMES IN RECENT DECADES
latter. The results of discouraging exports included inefficient utilization of
resources and reinforcement of already existing export pessimism. At the same
time, the authorities evidently failed to appreciate that the limited growth in
exports reflected in part a reaction to the policies selected because of the
original export pessimism.
Evidence of such differentiation between imports and exports is multi-
faceted: ii
i. The lowest three ITRs and EPRs in 1961 (including the only three E
negative values for the latter group) were for the export-oriented mining A
sectors—iron, copper, and nitrates. For these same three sectors in 1961 and ii
for all of the 1968 estimates, which are for exports only, the EPRs were always
less than the ITRs.
ii. For the 1968 exports-only estimates the mean ITR was 18 per cent; the
mean EPR, 3 per cent. These means were far below those for the other esti-
mates (and significantly so at the 5 per cent level). If a reasonable adjustment
were made for overvaluation, moreover, the adjusted means would be negative.15
iii. The DRCs for the export-oriented products in each subsector were
uniformly below thosefortotalsubsectoral production (DRC2 versus
DRC1). The mean of the former distribution was significantly below that of
the latter.
iv. Table A.5 includes several significant correlations which reflect a bias
toward import substitution: the positive association between the 1961 average
tariff rate on intermediate inputs and EPR1 and EPR2; 16 the negative correla-
don between the average tariff rate on intermediate inputs and the exports-only
EPR4; the negative correlations between the 1962 ratios of exports to domestic
production and ITR1, ITR2, and EPR4; the positive association between the
1962 ratio of imports to domestic production and ITR2; the positive associa-
C
tion between the 1962 ratio of imported inputs to domestic production and t
ITR2 and EPR3; 17 and the negative correlation between the ratio of imported
inputs to domestic production and the exports-only ITR3.
v. Bacha and Taylor [1973] present DRCs for a number of new Chilean
export-promotion or import-substitution products in the late 1 960s. The mean V
value of the former was over 20 per cent below that of the latter. Selowsky I
[1970:12] also estimates that the DRC of earning one dollar by exporting in
1969 was two-thirds that of saving a dollar by importing. U
V
DIFFERENCES AMONG FINAL-USE SECTORS. p
Among final-use categories, some evidence exists to suggest higher pro- II
tection for the more consumption-oriented sectors. Positive correlations exist ii
between the proportion of sectoral production going to consumption (private 11
orgovernment) and ITR1, ITR3, and EPR4 and between the proportion of P
sectoral imports going to consumption and ITR1 and ITR2 (Table A.7). These
a
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f associations again reflect favoritism for the traditional, "easy," and largely
consumption-oriented import-substitution industries.'8
1
5.2.3Differences in Relative Protection over Time.
A third general feature of the estimates in Table 5.3 is the indication of
important differences between 1961 and 1967. In fact neither the ITRs nor the
EPRs are significantly correlated across subsectors for the two years (Table
A.4). Given that the 1962—64 Phase II period falls between these two years,
d the existence of differences is not surprising.
OVER-ALL DIFFERENCES.
Although the mean level of the ITRs declined from 83 per cent in 1961
I- to 48 per cent in 1967, the mean level of the EPRs (EPR2) increased from
it 133 to 168 per cent.'9 The standard deviation and the range for the EPRs in-
15 creasedeven more: from 117 to 282 per cent for the former and from 488 to
1,127 per cent for the latter. The barriers protecting various subsectors thus
tended to be greater and more dispersed in 1967 than in 1961. This view is
consistent with the previous classification of 1961 as being near the end of
the most liberal regime since 1930 and of 1967 as being at about the middle
IS of a Phase III regime in which liberalization accelerated during the last years.
SECTORAL DIFFERENCES.
On the sectoral level, protection shifted relatively from agriculture to
e manufacturing. The EPR for agriculture, in fact, dropped from 145 to —7 per
- cent.This fall is in sharp contrast to the stated intent of the Frei government
—d to improve the terms of trade for agriculture.20
• SUBSECTORAL DIFFERENCES.
Shifts at the subsectoral level were substantial, but were in the direction
which the Frei government had indicated it would pursue. The subsectors with
y EPRs greater than 100 per cent in 1967 (in decreasing order) were petroleum p
and coal products, textiles, electrical machinery, food products, rubber prod-
ucts, and transport equipment. Even though textiles and food products still
were relatively highly protected, a substantial change had been made in the
I protectivestructure to favor more import substitution in nontraditional
intermediate-goods industries (with lower DRCs, at least in 1961) instead of
it in the traditional consumption-goods subsectors. The correlation coefficients
C in Table A.5 provide further support for the foregoing characterization of 1967
protection. The EPRs across subsectors for that year were positively associated
C with several features of "modern" industries: high ratios of capital to labor,144EVOLUTIONOF EXCHANGE CONTROL REGIMES IN RECENT DECADES
large of machinery and equipment in the capital stocks, and heavy
use of intermediate inputs, especially imported ones.
IMPORT SUBSTITUTION VERSUS EXPORT PROMOTION.
The Frei government also advocated furnishing greater incentives for cx-
ports, and introduced some policy changes—such as the expanded drawback
program for nontraditional exports—in pursuit of that end (see subsection
4.2.2). The impact of such policies on import substitution versus export pro-
motion, however, was quite limited by 1967. Tables A.5 and A.6 contain no
significantly nonzero correlations consistent with either a distribution of EPRS
in 1967 or a change in this distribution since 1961 that was relatively favor-
able to exports.a1 The 1968 exports-only estimates in Table 5.3, as is de-
scribed above, also do not indicate that any very great success was attained in
encouraging export promotion.
DIFFERENCES AMONG FINAL-USE SECTORS.
EPRs shifted away from consumption-oriented subsectors. The ratios of
the 1967 to 1961 EPRs, in fact, are significantly negatively correlated with
the consumption share in imports (Table A.6).22 This shift is associated with
the fall in relative protection for the traditional, import-substitution industries
mentioned above.
It should also be observed that from 1961 to 1967 the ITRs changed
from being positively associated with the share of private consumption in im-
ports to being positively associated with the share of investment in imports
(Table A.5). This increased discrimination against imported machinery and
equipment (for much of which the ITRs are more significant than EPRs, since
domestic production is nil) contrasts with the announced intentions of the
Central Bank during this phase.
NOTES
1. Isolated exceptions were 1946 and 1957.
2. As is indicated in Appendix A, part of the premium may originate in adjustment
lags between domestic and international prices which are independent of the nature of
foreign-sector policies.
3. If the original importer uses an import himself then the PLD.EER(PI) represents
0
theeffect of the regime on the price which he could have obtained, i.e., on the opportunity
cost.
4. Consider how the premium would increase in Figure 5.1, for example, if the
• demand curve shifted to the right.
5. Another contributing factor was the existence of adjustment lags in highly in-
flationary conditions, except in 1961 (see section 13.4).EERs, EPRs, ANDDRCs 145
6. Declines in inflation also may have alleviated the shortage of foreign exchange
"F)' (see the preceding note).
7. For recent discussions of other measures of the effects of the international
economic regime on the domestic economy, see Bacha and Taylor [1971], Balassa [19711,
Balassa and Schydlowsky [19721, Bhagwati and Srinivasan [1971], Bruno [1972], Cordon
[1971], Grubel and Johnson [1971], Hansen [1973], and Krueger [1972a], and the numer-
ck ous references there.
8. For qualifications to this method occasioned by the presence of market im-
Ofl perfections, see Bhagwati [1970].
9. As Cohen [1971] points out, the notion of effective protection has a long history.
no Humud [1969] has uncovered references in the Chilean literature dating back to the 1840s.
Recent interest in EPRs stems from the studies by Balassa [1965], Cordon [1966], and
Johnson [1965].
10. The seminal articles on DRCs are Bruno [1963, 1965] and Krueger [19661.
As Bruno [1972:17] notes, such calculations have a history of practical application at
least since the early 1950s in Israel. The problem of determining the appropriate shadow
prices in a nonoptimal world is a substantial one, as Balassa and Schydlowsky [1972:66]
have stressed. Unless such shadow prices are basically constant, moreover, as Bruno
[1972:31—32] has emphasized, DRCs (or,for that matter, EPRs based on shadow
prices) cannot be used to infer rankings of projects for ex ante investment decisions, but
of only to decide whether or not a specific project should be undertaken.
jth 11. For the alternative set of estimates for 1961, i.e., EPRI, the mean was 254
tb per cent and the EPRs for 13 subsectors exceeded 100 per cent.
es 12. Since the means for the EPRs exceed the means for the underlying ITRs, both
in Tables 5.3 and A.3, it might seem that greater protection is given on average to value
added than to product. Under the assumption that the underlying distributions across
ed subsectors are approximately normal, however, none of these differences is significantly
fl- nonzero at the 5 per cent level.
ts 13. For the EPR1 estimates for 1961, the ranking differs somewhat in its details,
but the basic point is not affected: for either EPR1 or EPR2, reversals in the sense that
EPRs were less than ITRs were very rare for the traditional manufacturing subsectors.
Instead, cascading predominated.
14. The more traditional industries tended to be subsectors with low ratios of capital
to value added and low wages. Therefore the inverse correlations in Table A.5 between
each of these two characteristics and EPR2 support the statement in the text. Mufloz
[1968] describes the timing of import substitution.
15. Bacha and Taylor [1973], for example, estimate that the escudo was overvalued
by 24 per cent in 1968.
16. If final product rates exactly compensated for variances in intermediate import
costs, one would expect this correlation coefficient to be nonsignificant. That itis
nt significantlypositivesuggests overcompensation. The negative one next mentioned
likewise implies undercompensation for export-oriented products.
17. The interpretation given in the previous note also holds here.
ts 18. As indicated in Chapter 3, despite the general encouragement of import sub-
stitution in consumption industries, certain mass-consumption imports had relatively low
EERs. Such imports were concentrated in a few subsectors, however; so the over-all
Ic positive association between consumption orientation and protection dominates in the
correlation across all subsectors.
19. EPR1 is not comparable to EPR3 because of the different treatment of depre-
ciation. See Appendix B.
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20. The figures in column 2 of Table 5.2, however, do indicate some success was
achieved in lessening the discrepancy between the PLD-EER(PI)s for agriculture and
manufacturing during 1965—70, although the difference at the start of the phase was
much greater than that which prevailed in some earlier years (including the preceding
phase).
21. As indicated in subsection 4.2.2, however, export-expansion efforts were in-
tensified in the later years of this phase. The suggestion of the figures in column 6 of
Table 5.2 is that these intensified efforts were to some extent successful.
22. ITRs may change much differently than EPRs. The ratio of ITRs, in fact, is
significantly positively correlated with that same variable.
I
S